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Bringing Clarity to Administrative Search Doctrine:
Distinguishing Dragnets from Special Subpopulation Searches*
by Eve Brensike Primus
Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School

Introduction
Anyone who has been stopped at a sobriety checkpoint, screened at an international border, scanned by
a metal detector at an airport or government building,
or drug tested for public employment has been subjected to an administrative search or seizure. Searches
of public school students, government employees, and
probationers are characterized as administrative, as are
business inspections and- increasingly-wiretaps and
other searches used in the gathering of national security intelligence. In other words, the government conducts thousands of administrative searches every day.
None of these searches requires either probable cause
or a search warrant. Instead, courts evaluating administrative searches need only balance the government's
interest in conducting the search against the degree of
intrusion on the affected individual's privacy to determine whether the search is reasonable. This reasonableness balancing is very deferential to the government,
and the resulting searches are almost always deemed
reasonable. As a result, the administrative search exception functions as an enormously broad license for
the government to conduct searches free from constitutional limitation.
Formulating the boundaries and requirements of
administrative search doctrine is therefore a matter of
great importance, and yet the rules governing administrative searches are notoriously unclear. Much of the

*Adapted by permission from Disentangling Administrative Searches, 111 Columbia Law Review 254(2011)

mischief in administrative search law can be traced to
the Supreme Court's conflation of two distinct types
of searches within one doctrinal exception. For ease of
reference, I will call them "dragnet searches" and "special subpopulation searches." Dragnets came first, and
special subpopulation searches came later, but without any clear understanding that something new was
afoot. As the category of administrative searches tried
to accommodate both kinds of searches as if they were
the same thing, it gradually lost the ability to impose
meaningful limitations on either one.

... the administrative search
exception functions as an
enormously broad license for the
government to conduct searches
free from constitutional limitation
When the concept of administrative searches first
entered the law in the 1960s, it was designed for dragnet intrusions- searches or seizures of every person,
place, or thing in a specific location or involved in a
specific activity. Such intrusions were permissible if
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they involved only minimally intrusive government
actions necessary to protect important health or safety
interests that an individualized probable cause regime
could not sufficiently protect. Before the Court would
approve a dragnet, the government had to demonstrate
that it was acting pursuant to either a warrant or a
statutory regime that imposed clear limits on executive discretion. Typical examples of dragnet intrusions
included safety inspections of all homes in a neighborhood, checkpoint searches of all persons driving on a
particular roadway, and inspections of all businesses in
a particular industry.
In the 1980s, the Court added special subpopulation
searches to the category of administrative searches.
According to the Court, certain people (or people acting in certain capacities) have reduced expectations of
privacy relative to the public at large, such that public
officials need not satisfy the traditional warrant and
probable cause requirements before searching them.
Instead, officials can conduct searches on the basis
of some lower level of individualized suspicion. Examples of special subpopulation searches included
searches of public school students, probationers, and
government employees.
Because these two kinds of intrusions raise different
issues, each was· once properly limited by a different
set of doctrinal safeguards. Once they were both labeled "administrative," however, they were regarded
as making up a single category, and the safeguards
surrounding each kind of administrative search faded
away as judges applied inapposite lessons from one
kind of search to the other. The result is a doctrine that
imposes few limits on government conduct and paves
the way for indiscriminate searches and seizures. To
62
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clarify and improve this area of the law, I argue that
we should disentangle the two strands of administrative search doctrine and restore the Fourth Amendment safeguards that existed in each context before the
cross-contamination.

Dragnets (1967-1984)
The Supreme Court first recognized the pemiissibility of dragnet administrative searches in Camara v.
Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967), when it suggested that routine government inspections of homes
for housing code violations could be conducted without individualized showings of probable cause. The
housing inspections at issue were not conducted on
the basis of any particularized reason to believe that
a given house was in violation of the housing code.
Rather, government officials executed a general plan
of inspecting every home in a given geographic area.
The government fully expected that many or even most
of the homes would be in compliance with the housing
codes, such that the inspections would burden many
law-abiding homeowners. If the normal requirement of
individualized probable cause were in force, therefore,
such inspections would violate the Fourth Amendment.
Rather than categorically rejecting dragnet searches,
however, the Court carved out an exception. In stating
that generalized housing inspection programs can pass
muster, the Court emphasized the importance of the
government's interest in protecting community health
by ensuring that homes are up to code. On the other
side of the balance, the Court noted that "because the
inspections are neither personal in nature nor aimed at
the discovery of evidence of crime, they involve a relatively limited invasion of the urban citizen's privacy."
That said, the importance _of the government's interest and the minimally intrusive nature of the search
were only necessary conditions, not sufficient ones,
for exempting the housing inspection program from
the default rule requiring individualized suspicion. As
the Court emphasized, dispensing with individualized
showings of probable cause was appropriate only because the government's important health and safety
interests could not be served effectively through individualized canvassing techniques. The Court noted
that many housing conditions raising health and safety
issues, such as faulty wiring, "are not observable from
outside the building and indeed may not be apparent to
the inexpert occupant himself." As a result, the Court
concluded, the government need not have individualized probable cause before conducting a housing inspection. Rather, it could rely on area-wide probable
cause that searches in a particular neighborhood would
reveal housing code violations.
© 2012 Thomson Reuters
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In the 10 years after Camara was decided, the Supreme Court permitted administrative searches only
for routine fire code inspections and regular inspections of certain highly regulated and intuitively dangerous businesses-namely firearms dealers and liquor
establishments-to ensure compliance with statutory
record-keeping requirements and licensing restrictions.
See U.S. v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972); Colonnade
Catering Co. v. U.S., 397 U.S. 72 (1970); See v. City of
Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967). As was true with the Camara housing inspections, the dragnet inspections in
these cases involved minimally intrusive government
invasions conducted for important health and safety
reasons that could not have been adequately served by
an individualized probable cause regime.
During that same time period, the Court struck
down many proposed administrative searches-even
minimally intrusive ones-because alternative regimes
predicated on individualized suspicion could reasonably serve the government's interests. For example, the
Court rejected various government attempts to employ
roving vehicle stops, noting the availability of alternative, individualized suspicion regimes that could be
equally effective in serving the government's stated interests. See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979);
U.S. v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975); AlmeidaSanchez v. U.S., 413 U.S. 266 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring). If the government could labor under the individualized suspicion requirement and still successfully
abate hazardous conditions, then there was no good
reason to expose large numbers of innocent people to
unnecessary dragnets.
In addition to ensuring that administrative searches
were employed only when they were (1) justified in
light of the balance of interests and (2) necessary because a regime of individualized suspicion could not
effectively serve the government's interest, the Court
was careful to limit the conduct of such searches in
order to protect citizens against arbitrariness. After
all, even if administrative searches are limited as described above, there remains a danger that government
officials will use them in arbitrary, discriminatory, or
harassing ways. The normal method of protecting citizens against arbitrary searches is to limit the discretion
of executive officials, either by requiring that a neutral
decisionmaker issue a warrant before a government intrusion occurs or by requiring the government to justify an intrusion after the fact by pointing to facts establishing a required level of individualized suspicion.
Obviously, the ex post alternative was inapposite for
the dragnet scenario, because dragnets are undertaken
without individualized suspicion. Accordingly, the
Court would approve only dragnet intrusions that were
authorized in advance through a mechanism designed
© 201 2 Thomson Reuters
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to eliminate the danger of arbitrariness that would arise
if executive officials had discretion regarding how and
whom to search.
The most common method of eliminating executive
discretion in administrative searches during this early
period was requiring the government to obtain a warrant for an "area inspection" before conducting a dragnet search. The San Francisco Municipal Code ordinance at issue in Camara authorized housing officials
to inspect apartment buildings "at least once a year and
as often thereafter as may be deemed necessary" so
long as the inspections were conducted "at reasonable
times." The Court struck down the program, noting
that "[t]he practical effect of this system is to leave the
occupant subject to the discretion of the officer in the
field. This is precisely the discretion to invade private
property which we have consistently circumscribed
by a requirement that a disinterested party warrant the
need to search." The Court emphasized that the warrant need not be a traditional individualized warrant;
it could be a warrant to search the apartment homes in
a given area, supported by probable cause that an area
search would reveal housing code violations. But the
Court recognized that some form of oversight was necessary in order to protect homeowners from arbitrary
government intrusions conducted under the cover of
the dragnet exception.
For the next 15 years, when the Court confronted
the question of a dragnet's legitimacy under the Fourth
Amendment, it examined the degree to which the regime authorizing the dragnet search limited the discretion of the officials conducting the search. The Su-
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preme Court struck down the Border Patrol's practice
of stopping and searching cars near the border without
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity because of the
discretion that the program gave to border patrol officers. See U.S. v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975);
Almeida-Sanchez v. U.S., 413 U.S. 266 (1973). Even
fixed checkpoints near the border were impermissible
if checkpoint officials had discretion to select which
cars to search at the fixed locations. See U.S. v. Ortiz,
422 U.S. 891 (1975).
When the Court did depart from the warrant requirement as a means of circumscribing government
discretion during this time period, it substituted other
requirements designed to limit government discretion.
In U.S. v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972), the Court upheld the warrantless search of a pawn shop pursuant
to a statutory inspection regime targeted at businesses
selling guns and ammunition. Although the Court did
not dwell on the need to limit government discretion,
it specifically noted that the regulatory scheme ensured
that inspections were "carefully limited in time, place,
and scope."
Nine years later, in Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594
(1981 ), the Court discussed the substitution of statutes
or regulations for warrants at somewhat greater length.
"Where Congress has authorized inspection but made
no rules governing the procedures that inspectors must
follow," the Court explained that a warrant would be
necessary "to protect the owner from the 'unbridled
discretion [of] executive and administrative officers."'
Where Congress has made rules governing inspection
procedures, however, a warrantless inspection could
be upheld, but only if Congress' regime "establishes
a predictable and guided federal regulatory presence"
that does not "leav[e] the frequency and purpose of inspections to the unchecked discretion of Government
officers."
In the first phase of administrative search doctrine,
then, the Court dispensed with the Fourth Amendment's requirement of individualized suspicion only
for dragnet searches that complied with three basic
values of the Fourth Amendment. First, the searches
had to be justified in terms of the balance between the
importance of the government's interest and the degree
of intrusion upon individuals. That the searches at issue aimed to serve health and safety needs was an important fact on both sides of this balance: The health
and safety needs at issue were considered serious, but
the fact that the search did not threaten the citizen with
the normal apparatus of law enforcement helped the
intrusion on privacy seem relatively minimal. Second, dispensing with the requirement of individualized
suspicion had to be necessary in order to advance the
governmental interest at stake. Third, the searches had
64
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to be cabined in ways that limited the discretion of executive officials, lest permission to conduct searches
without individualized suspicion become a license to
engage in arbitrary or harassing behavior.

Special subpopulations (1976-1987)
In the 1980s, the Court expanded the administrative
search exception and allowed the government to escape
the Fourth Amendment's warrant and individualized
probable cause requirements in a second type of case.
The new category involved what I will call "special
subpopulations." Special subpopulations are groups of
individuals with reduced expectations of privacy, including students, government employees, probationers, and parolees. Beginning at this time, the Court
began permitting warrantless searches of members of
these special subpopulations based on mere reasonable
suspicion of wrongdoing, rather than probable cause.
As was true of dragnets, these special subpopulation
searches were predicated on an asserted government
need that was independent of law enforcement. But
along all three of the dimensions identified above as
essential for permissible dragnets, special subpopulation searches were different.
The first difference concerned the balance between
the government's interest and the degree of intrusion
on privacy. In general, special subpopulation searches
are more intrusive than the early dragnets were'. Dragnets typically involved cursory inspections of relatively nonprivate areas. Housing inspectors went into
basements to look at pipes; they did not go into bedrooms to read diaries. In contrast, special subpopulation searches often involved full-blown searches of
people or personal property.
Second, special subpopulation searches featured
a reduction in the degree of individualized suspicion
required to authorize a search, rather than a complete
elimination of the individualized suspicion requirement. Special subpopulation searches were thus initially created as an exception to the probable cause
requirement but not necessarily to individualized suspicion altogether.
Third, the prospect of executive discretion was
much less troubling to the Court in the context of special subpopulations. Government officials did not need
to obtain warrants or rely on preexisting statutory or
regulatory regimes before performing a special subpopulation administrative search. Rather, to cabin executive discretion, the Court relied on a post hoc analysis of the reasonableness of the government's showing
of individualized suspicion.
In addition, the two kinds of searches raise different
issues simply on the basis of the different background
assumptions, in each case, about the people who are
© 2012 Thomson Reuters
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searched. Dragnets involve blanket intrusions on entire populations with the knowledge that many or even
most of those searched will be innocent. In contrast,
special subpopulation searches are targeted. They focus on specific individuals, much as routine investigative practices do. In one sense, this difference makes
special subpopulation searches less troubling than
dragnet searches as a constitutional matter: They burden people whom the Court has already designated as
having reduced expectations of privacy, whereas dragnets routinely invade the privacy interests of individuals who have full expectations of privacy. On the other
hand, special subpopulation searches are more likely
to carry the stigmatic burdens associated with the suspicion of wrongdoing. Indeed, these burdens on the
people searched are aggravated in the special subpopulation context precisely because such searches often
target people, such as probationers and parolees, who
are already treated as marginal or deserving of less respect than the population as a whole.
The entanglement of dragnet and special subpopulation searches was gradual. It occurred at least in
part because there are a number of factual scenarios
in which either rationale could justify a government
search. Imagine, for example, that the government
stops a traveler going through customs at an international airport. The stop could be conducted pursuant
to a dragnet policy under which people who enter the
country are automatically stopped and questioned.
Alternatively, if the traveler was acting suspiciously
when he approached customs, the stop might also be
justified within the special subpopulation framework:
People who cross the border have reduced expectations
of privacy, and this individual's conduct created reasonable suspicion, even if not probable cause. Thus, it
may be helpful to think of the dragnet and special subpopulation variants of administrative search doctrine
as different theories with which the government can
justify a given search rather than as describing different factual scenarios in which searches occur. Just as
there are different exceptions to the warrant and probable cause requirements that might justify a car search
in a given case, there may be alternative ways that the
government could justify an administrative search.
The two administrative search rationales can appear
in tandem for other reasons as well. For example, even
if the two arguments might not justify exactly the same
intrusion on privacy, they might be germane at different
moments within the same litigated encounter. Consider
vehicle sobriety checkpoints. Cars that are stopped when
approaching a sobriety checkp0int are typically stopped
pursuant to a dragnet policy that requires police to stop
every vehicle that passes through the checkpoint. The
decision regarding whom to refer to a secondary inspec© 2012 Thomson Reuters
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tion area, however, is an individualized decision to further scrutinize a person who has a reduced expectation
of privacy. In a case challenging a search conducted at a
sobriety checkpoint, therefore, both kinds of administrative search arguments might be in play.
Given the overlapping and sequential ways in which
these two doctrines can apply, it is perhaps not surprising that the Supreme Court was not always clear about
where one rationale ended and the other began. Indeed,
the Court took its first step toward entangling dragnet
and special subpopulation searches in a case involving
both a dragnet and an individualized intrusion. In U.S. v.
Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976), border patrol officials looking for illegal aliens stopped the respondents'
cars as part of fixed dragnet immigration checkpoints
near the Mexican border and then referred some cars to
secondary inspection areas where the drivers and passengers were questioned. The initial stop was a dragnet
seizure of all cars that drove through the checkpoint, and
it was conducted pursuant to a magistrate's warrant. The
decision regarding whom to refer to a secondary inspection area, however, was an individualized decision left to
the discretion of the border patrol official.
Had the Court focused clearly on the two different
phases of the encounter, it might have evaluated the
initial stop as administrative in the dragnet sense and
then evaluated the secondary and individualized questioning as an intrusion upon persons with a reduced
expectation of privacy. But the Martinez-Fuerte Court
failed to distinguish between the initial checkpoint
where everyone was stopped and the secondary detention where border patrol officials selectively subjected
a chosen few to additional scrutiny. Rather, the Court
characterized the entire exchange as one form of legitimate administrative search that need not be supported
by any showing of reasonable or articulable suspicion.
It used the framework for justifying the initial dragnet
traffic stop to legitimate both parts of the intrusion. In
so doing, it for the first time upheld an individualized
search or seizure-the secondary questioning-on an
administrative search rationale.
The Martinez-Fuerte Court's importation of special
subpopulation searches into the administrative search
exception was not explicit. The Court never actually
stated that individualized intrusions could be upheld as
administrative searches. Rather, it glossed over the individualized nature of the intrusion by lumping it together
with the initial dragnet stop. It was not until 1985 that
the Court explicitly incorporated special subpopulation
searches into the administrative search category.
In New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985), the
Supreme Court upheld a vice principal's warrantless,
discretionary decision to search an individual high
school student's purse without probable cause. Relying
65
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on its decision in Camara, the T.L.O. Court found that
there was an important non-law enforcement need to
maintain order in the schools and that this need justified dispensing with the warrant and probable cause
requirements, just as the need to maintain housing
· safety had done earlier. The Court further cited Martinez-Fuerte to support the idea that a warrant supported
by individualized probable cause is not an indispensable requirement of the Fourth Amendment. That is,
the Court drew on two dragnet administrative search
cases to establish the propriety of relaxing the Fourth
Amendment's privacy protections in a case involving
no nondiscretionary dragnet at all, but instead a targeted search of a person within a special subpopulation having a reduced expectation of privacy. Because
the government's interest in safety and order was sufficiently important, the Court held that warrantless
searches of students by school officials need only be
justified under a reasonable suspicion standard.
Although the T.L.O. Court did not explicitly characterize the vice principal's search as administrative,
the precedents on which it drew squarely situated the
decision in the line of administrative search cases.
Moreover, Justice Blackmun's concurring opinion
articulated a test-the "special needs" test-that the
Court would use for determining the validity of administrative searches in later cases. Under the special
needs test, a court may dispense with the warrant and
probable cause requirements "[o]nly in those exceptional circumstances in which special needs, beyond
the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable cause requirement impracticable." If
the government can demonstrate that it has such a special need, then the court will balance the government's
interest against the degree of intrusion to determine
whether a search is reasonable. If there is no special
need, then the government needs to satisfy the requirements of the Warrant Clause before it may search.
The rise of the special needs test helped complete the
conflation of the two different rationales for administrative searches, as the Court came to use the special needs
test regardless of which type of search was at issue.
Two years after T.L.O., the Court upheld the discretionary search of an individual government employee's office by relying on the special needs test. See O'Connor
v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 ( 1987). In so doing, the Court
explicitly connected its special subpopulation and dragnet precedents by emphasizing that Camara and T.L.O.
were both cases involving special needs.
Later that term, the Court officially imported the
special needs test into the dragnet context. Writing
for a majority of the Court in New York v. Burger, 482
U.S. 691 (1987), Ju~tice Blackmun used his special
needs test to uphold the dragnet search of a junkyard
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pursuant to a state statute authorizing periodic inspections of vehicle-dismantling industries. Since Burger,
the Court has invoked the special needs test to assess
individualized special subpopulation searches of probationers as well as dragnet drug testing procedures
aimed at patients in public hospitals, government employees, and public school students. See Bd. of Educ.
v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822 (2002); Ferguson v. Charleston,
532 U.S. 67 (2001); Vernonia Sch. Dist. 471 v. Acton,
515 U.S. 646 (1995); Nat'/ Treasury Emps. Union v.
Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989); Skinner v. Ry. Labor
Execs.' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989); Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868 (1987). By the late 1980s, it ceased to
matter whether an administrative search was a dragnet
or a discretionary search of an individual who was a
member of a special subpopulation with reduced expectations of privacy. The test was the same; the entanglement was complete.

The effects of entanglement
Once dragnet and special subpopulation searches
were lumped together, administrative search doctrine
evolved in response to the conflation. Many of the
safeguards that the Supreme Court had implemented to
protect citizens against arbitrary and unnecessary government intrusions in each context were fundamentally
inapposite to the other. As a result, the Court frequently
found itself adjudicating cases in which doctrinal safeguards previously implemented for "administrative
searches" seemed out of place. It responded by weakening or eliminating those safeguards, and, in so doing,
created an administrative search doctrine that permits
arbitrary, unnecessary, and highly-intrusive government intrusions.

Arbitrary government intrusions
Dragnets. Whereas the Court had focused on limiting government discretion in dragnet cases in order
to prevent arbitrary intrusions, searches of individuals
who were members of special subpopulations required
discretion. Something had to give. The tension was apparent in U.S. v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976).
In discussing the border officials' conduct during the
initial dragnet stop of the cars at the checkpoint, the
Court focused on the need to eliminate executive discretion. Distinguishing the fixed checkpoint in Martinez-Fuerte from the roving stops that it had struck
down in the past, the Court noted that these officers
lacked discretion to determine where to locate a checkpoint and which cars to detain, thus reducing the risk of
abusive or harassing stops. The Court further noted that
the checkpoint was established in accordance with a
magistrate's warrant of inspection. But when the Court
began to analyze the border officials' actions in referring the respondents to the secondary inspection areas,
© 2012 Thomson Reuters
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its attitude toward discretion changed entirely. Rather
than ask whether the officers had only limited discretion with respect to secondary inspections, the Court
embraced government discretion as a necessary feature
of secondary stops. Indeed, it specifically declared that
border patrol officials must have "wide discretion" in
selecting which motorists should be subjected to further scrutiny and that many incidents of checkpoint
operation must be "committed to the discretion of such
officials." Thus, the discretion that was a primary evil
to be avoided in dragnet searches was not only permissible but embraced as important and necessary when
the intrusion at issue was individualized.
Had the Martinez-Fuerte majority cleanly distinguished between the two types of intrusions at issue,
it might have made the sensible point that executive
discretion should be eliminated for one phase of the
encounter but not for the other. But because the Court
failed to foreground (or perhaps even to notice) that
distinction, its discussion of discretion simply seemed
muddled and self-contradictory.
Three years later, in Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S.
648 (1979), the Court struck down roving vehicle stops
to check drivers' licenses, because the police had too
much discretion in choosing which vehicles to stop. At
first blush, Prouse appears to support limits on government discretion, but the Court's language and analysis
actually dilute the requirement that administrative regimes limit government discretion. Shortly after stating
that the roving stops at issue involved standardless and
unconstrained discretion, the Court wrote that its previous cases had "insisted that the discretion of the official
in the field be circumscribed, at least to some extent."
This qualifying language was new, and it represented
a substantial weakening of the Court's prior language
about the need to limit government discretion.
Similarly, the Prouse Court read Martinez-Fuerte
in a way that downplayed that prior decision's focus on eliminating discretion during the first phase
of the roadblock search- that is, the portion sensibly
analyzed as a dragnet. As noted above, the Court in
Martinez-Fuerte had emphasized that roving-stop regimes involve greater executive discretion than checkpoint regimes. Prouse omitted that portion of Martinez-Fuerte 's analysis entirely, instead describing the
crucial difference between the roving stops that it had
struck down and the checkpoints upheld in MartinezFuerte as a difference in degree of intrusion. That is,
it rested the distinction on the proposition that roving
stops are more subjectively intrusive than checkpoint
stops, a consideration that sounds in the balance between government and individual interests rather than
in the need to limit governmental discretion. To be fair,
the Martinez-Fuerte Court did draw this distinction:
© 201 2 Thomson Reuters
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Martinez-Fuerte, like Prouse, took the position that
roving stops are more intrusive. But Martinez-Fuerte
also called attention to the problem of governmental
discretion, and Prouse omitted that concern entirely.
Four years later, the Court took the further step of
transforming the requirement of limited governmental discretion into a mere factor that the Court may or
may not consider as part of a reasonableness balancing test. In U.S. v. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. 579
( 1983), the Supreme Court approved a statutory regime
that allowed for completely discretionary decisions by
customs officials to stop and board any ship in United
States waters for the purpose of inspecting the ship's
documentation. Yes, the Court said, Prouse had discussed the interest in limiting discretion, and people
certainly had the right to travel without purely discretionary intrusions from law enforcement officers. But
the overall focus in administrative search law, the Villamonte-Marquez Court maintained, was on whether a
law enforcement practice was "reasonable" -a matter
to be judged by balancing the practice's intrusion on
the individual's privacy interests against the government's interests. There was no longer a separate and
distinct requirement that administrative search regimes
limit government discretion.
Since Villamonte-Marquez, the Court routinely
fails to consider whether a challenged administrative
search regime limits executive discretion. To be sure,
the decreasing concern with discretion in this line of
cases should be understood as a general trend rather
than a steady and constant pattern. A few dragnet cases
have continued to discuss the need to limit government
discretion, and perhaps others will in the future. But
such discussions are now the exception rather than the
norm. What was once a robust requirement in dragnet
search cases is now a mere factor that a court might or
might not consider.
Moreover, when the Court does refer to the need
to limit government discretion in dragnet regimes, its
analysis often fails to engage seriously with the question of whether the administrative regime in question
actually limits discretion. Consider New York v. Burger,
482 U.S. 691 (1987), which remains the Court's leading decision on business inspections. In that case, the
police searched a junkyard pursuant to a state statute
authorizing periodic inspections of vehicle-dismantling
industries, and the Court upheld the search. Burger was
decided only five years after Villamonte-Marquez, and
the Burger Court identified the elimination of executive discretion as one of the factors that courts should
analyze in determining whether a business inspection
scheme is constitutionally reasonable even without a
warrant requirement. In particular, the Court suggested
that the existence of a statute providing for inspections
67
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is a sufficient substitute for a warrant. But apparently
the Court meant this suggestion in the broadest possible sense: The mere existence of a statute did the
trick, rendering it unnecessary to ask whether the statute's provisions actually limited discretion or, indeed,
whether the officers conducting the search complied
with whatever the statute did require.
In Burger itself, the statute authorizing the search
vested a lot of discretion in government officials. The
statute's only limitations were that inspections must
occur in the daytime, that the businesses subject to inspection must be in the vehicle-dismantling industry
"and related industries," and that the inspectors must
limit their examinations to vehicles, vehicle parts, and
records. The statute did not specify how many searches
were to be performed, or how frequently, or how businesses should be selected to be searched, or what "related industries" would fall under the statute. More egregiously, the Court never examined whether the police
who inspected Burger's business actually followed this
statutory scheme. In Burger's case, the police did not
limit their search to the vehicle, vehicle parts, and records in Burger's business. All in all, then, it is hard to
read the Court's analysis as embodying an actual concern with limiting discretion. By creating a merged category of administrative searches in which dragnets can
be approved even without limits on executive discretion, the Court has invited precisely the results that consensus arguments for limiting discretion always warn
about: arbitrary, capricious, and harassing intrusions.
Special subpopulations. Administrative search doctrine had been shaped by the dragnet model, and dragnets are by definition exceptional searches that do not
require individualized suspicion. If special subpopulation searches were to be measured by the same criteria
as dragnets, the requirement of individualized suspicion
would naturally disappear. As was true of the Court's
growing tolerance for discretion in dragnets, the process
of removing the individualized suspicion requirement for
special subpopulation searches has been gradual.
In Martinez-Fuerte, the government officials admitted that both the initial dragnet intrusion and the subsequent secondary inspection were made without any
individualized suspicion of wrongdoing. The absence
of individualized suspicion was not a problem for the
Court, however, because the Court analyzed the entire
regime as a dragnet. In accordance with its precedents
on dragnets, the Court considered whether an individualized suspicion regime could reasonably satisfy the
government's interest in detecting the entry of illegal
aliens into the country. Finding that it could not, the
Court cited Camara for the proposition that "the Fourth
Amendment imposes no irreducible requirement of
such suspicion." That was true for dragnet searches,
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which were the only recognized administrative searches before Martinez-Fuerte. But Martinez-Fuerte failed
to distinguish between the dragnet and the individualized parts of the scheme it upheld, and later cases read
the statement as applicable to both parts of the scenario. Accordingly, Martinez-Fuerte came to suggest
that the government can make discretionary decisions
to search or seize members of special subpopulations
without individualized suspicion.
Between 1976 and 2006, the Supreme Court decided
five administrative search cases involving special subpopulations rather than dragnets. See U.S. v. Knights,
534 U.S. 112 (2001); Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S.
868 (1987); O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 (1987);
U.S. v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531 (1985);
New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985). Because
the government had individualized suspicion in each of
these cases, none of the cases presented the question of
whether individualized suspicion was a prerequisite in
special subpopulation searches. That said, the cases did
furnish opportunities for important dicta on the question. In T.L.O., for example, the Court cited MartinezFuerte and Camara for the proposition that individualized suspicion is not an irreducible requirement of
the Fourth Amendment. The Court reiterated the point
in both Knights, involving probationer searches, and
Ortega, involving searches of government employees'
offices. In short, the idea that the Fourth Amendment
could be satisfied without individualized suspicion became a regularly articulated proposition even outside
the exceptional context of dragnets.
A contemporaneous development in administrative
search law helped push that idea to its logical conclusion. While the idea that the Fourth Amendment could
tolerate searches without individualized suspicion was
migrating from the dragnet context to that of special
subpopulation searches, another doctrine-the special
needs test-was being extended from the special subpopulation context to that of dragnets. As discussed
above, the special needs test originated in the context of
searches of members of special subpopulations, where
it functioned as a test of whether the government could
justify a search with a showing of mere reasonable suspicion rather than probable cause. Under the special
needs test as classically articulated, the question for a
court to answer was whether a case presented "exceptional circumstances in which special needs, beyond
the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause requirements impracticable."
When the Court began using this formula in dragnet
cases, however, it began understanding its language in
a different way.
In the special subpopulation context, departing from
the probable cause requirement meant analyzing indi© 2012 Thomson Reuters

SEARCH AND SEIZURE LAW REPORT

vidualized suspicion only at the level of reasonableness. But the normal question about dragnet searches
is whether serving a particular government interest
justifies eliminating the requirement of individualized
suspicion entirely. For the special needs test to work in
the dragnet context, the language about the impracticability of the probable cause requirement had to be understood as authorizing an exception to the individualized suspicion requirement more generally, not merely
the heightened form of individualized suspicion called
probable cause. Eventually, the Court slightly modified the wording of the special needs test to reflect this
changed understanding: In his opinion for the Court
in National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab,
489 U.S. 656 (1989), a case involving a drug testing
dragnet, Justice Kennedy wrote that "[w]here a Fourth
Amendment intrusion serves special government needs,
beyond the normal need for law enforcement, it is necessary to balance the individual's privacy expectations
against the Government's interests to determine whether it is impractical to require a warrant or some level
of individualized suspicion in the particular context."
The transformation was complete. Having been passed
through the filter of dragnet doctrine, the primary test
used to analyze special subpopulation searches now
authorizes an explicit exception to any individualized
suspicion requirement, rather than merely reducing the
level of individualized suspicion that the government
is required to show. And so in the more recent case of
Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843 (2006), in which
the Court upheld a discretionary, warrantless, and suspicionless search of a parolee, Justice Thomas' opinion
for the majority had no apparent trouble maintaining
that the Fourth Amendment imposed no requirement of
individualized suspicion whatsoever.
The scope of Samson is not clear, but its potential
reach is quite expansive. Straightforward application
of Samson would permit discretionary and suspicionless searches of members of other special subpopulations with reduced expectations of privacy. But this
state of the doctrine is built upon a failure to recognize
critical differences between dragnet and individualized searches. Unlike in the dragnet context, there is
no demonstrated need in these special subpopulation
searches for the government to proceed without showing some quantum of individualized suspicion. And indeed, if special subpopulation searches are considered
on their own, the argument for eliminating the individualized suspicion requirement seems weak. More
or less everyone agrees that the Fourth Amendment is
supposed to protect citizens from arbitrary, harassing,
or discriminatory government conduct. It is a similarly
commonsense proposition that if the police are permitted to search individuals without warrants and without
© 2012 Thomson Reuters
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any individualized suspicion, the amount of arbitrary
and discriminatory government conduct will increase.

Unnecessary dragnets
Once it seems reasonable to conduct discretionary
searches without individualized suspicion, it can also
seem less important to limit suspicionless dragnets to
exceptional circumstances where they are truly necessary. Administrative search doctrine has accordingly
seen the removal of the traditional preference for individualized suspicion regimes over dragnets, which has
increased the incidence of unnecessary dragnets.
Just three years after Martinez-Fuerte implicitly
opened the door to regarding individualized searches
as administrative, the Court took its first step toward
eliminating the preference for individualized suspicion regimes over dragnets. In Brown v. Texas, 443
U.S. 47, 51 (1979), the Court noted that "the Fourth
Amendment requires that a seizure must be based on
specific, objective facts indicating that society's legitimate interests require the seizure of the particular
individual, or that the seizure must be carried out pursuant to a plan embodying explicit, neutral limitations
on the conduct of individual officers." Although not
immediately apparent at the time, the Court's use of
the disjunctive here reflected its new attitude toward
searches. In its later cases, the Court relied on Brown
to emphasize that searches could be predicated on either individualized suspicion or a neutral plan, but it no
longer asked whether the goals of a neutral plan might
be accomplished through an alternative individualized
suspicion regime.
As with the other lines of fallout from the crosscontamination, this change was neither immediate
nor clean: A few dragnet cases after Brown v. Texas
did examine whether alternatives predicated on individualized suspicion would adequately satisfy the government's goals. But most did not. In an increasingly
regular pattern, the Court approved dragnet regimes for
business inspections, maritime shipping, and motorist
sobriety with no discussion of whether individualized
suspicion regimes might adequately serve the government's interests. See Mich. Dep't of State Police v. Sitz,
496 U.S. 444 (1990); New York v. Burger, 482 U.S.
691 (1987); U.S. v. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. 579
(1983); Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594 (1981).
Perhaps the most salient example of this trend away
from a preference for individualized suspicion regimes
is Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz. In that
case, the Court relied on Brown v. Texas to uphold a
temporary sobriety checkpoint designed to stop drunk
driving. At no point in its decision did the Court consider whether an individualized suspicion regime might
effectively serve the state's interest in preventing drunk
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driving. Justice Stevens' dissent underscored the ineffectiveness of the sobriety checkpoint and emphasized
that a higher arrest rate might have occurred if the police had relied on the conventional Fourth Amendment
investigative techniques that required individualized
suspicion. In discussing the number of arrests that the
police made at the checkpoint, Justice Stevens noted
that "there is absolutely no evidence that this figure
represents an increase over the number of arrests that
would have been made by using the same law enforcement resources in conventional patrols .... Drunken
driving, unlike [alien] smuggling, may thus be detected
absent any checkpoints."
However, a majority of the Court approved of the
dragnet administrative search regime, emphasizing
that "the choice among such reasonable alternatives
remains with the governmental officials." The government need not rely on less intrusive, individualized
suspicion regimes. Rather, in the Court's present view,
the government has the latitude to choose among reasonable alternatives, and a dragnet search can be just
one more reasonable alternative, rather than a disfavored last resort.
As science and technology advance, dragnet investigative tools will become cheaper, more readily available, and easier to use. Now that administrative search
doctrine no longer requires the government to show
that an individualized search regime is inadequate or
unavailable, there is nothing to stop executive officials
from employing more and more dragnet investigative
techniques. We have, in fact, already seen evidence of
this trend. If dragnets lose their legally disfavored status at the same time as they become more technologically feasible, they will become routine. As a result,
many more innocent individuals will be subjected to
unnecessary government intrusions.

Highly-intrusive searches
One consequence of the elimination of the individualized suspicion requirement from administrative
search doctrine is that the permissibility of searches is
often governed only by an all-things-considered reasonableness standard. The reasonableness standard
currently in use is unnecessarily broad and too deferential to the government. Courts define the governmental
interests broadly and the privacy interests narrowly,
such that in practice the balancing test operates as a
form of rational basis review under which the government presumptively wins.
The entanglement of dragnet and special subpopulation searches is partly to blame for this overly broad
and highly deferential reasonableness standard. Dragnet searches prototypically involve generalized government health or safety interests and concrete, but
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minimal, privacy intrusions. Area housing inspections are a good example. The government interest in
safety is broadly stated, but the inspection is cursory
and represents a minimal privacy intrusion. In contrast, special subpopulation searches typically involve
much greater privacy intrusions and more concrete
government interests. A search of a student's purse is
personal and invasive, but it can be justified by the
concrete suspicion that the student is violating the
school's drug use policies. When the two categories
were fused into one, however, the result was a body of
case law including both precedents upholding searches based on generalized government interests (from
the dragnet cases) and precedents upholding invasive
privacy intrusions (from the special subpopulation
cases). Not surprisingly, government lawyers charged
with defending searches in court drew from both sets
of cases. The courts have not regarded any of this as
out of bounds: After all, the government lawyers are
citing cases setting forth both the kinds of interests
that justify "administrative searches" and the kinds of
privacy invasions that "administrative searches" may
validly involve. The result is a doctrine characterized
by large privacy intrusions predicated on generalized
government interests.
Consider People v. Smith, 92 Cal. Rptr. 3d 106 (Ct.
App. 2009), in which the government successfully relied on its generalized interest in preventing recidivism
to justify the warrantless, suspicionless inspection of
a parolee's genitalia. The case arose when a police officer saw Smith, a known parolee, in a car in the back
parking lot of a hotel. The officer stopped Smith, patted him down, and searched his car, but he did not find
any contraband. Relying on Smith's status as a parolee,
the police officer then removed Smith's belt, pulled
his pants away from his body, and visually inspected
Smith's genitalia. One might imagine that this conduct
would be deemed unreasonable on a general balancing
test or that the question would at least be a close one.
After all, a state's interest in reducing recidivism might
justify some extra supervision of parolees, but if anything is a serious invasion of privacy, being forced to
expose one's private parts to the police would seem to
qualify. Moreover, the officer had already patted Smith
down and searched the car and had not found any contraband. Nonetheless, the California Court of Appeal
upheld the search, relying on Samson for the general
proposition that the state has an interest in reducing
recidivism and reintegrating former prisoners into society. When addressing the highly invasive nature of
the search, the court stated that, because his "belt was
the only item of clothing removed, his private parts
were not exposed, and [he was not] touched[,] ... [t]he
intrusion ... did not constitute a broad invasion of his
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privacy and dignity rights." In short, the court downplayed the privacy invasion and read the government
interest expansively in order to uphold the search.
Perhaps a bit less inflammatorily-but similarly illustrative of the propensity to let generalized government interests "outweigh" concrete individual privacy
concerns- the Supreme Court has allowed school officials to conduct regular drug testing of middle school
students-without a warrant, and without any suspicion of a drug problem among that population-on the
grounds that the students participate in extracurricular
activities such as choir and marching band. See Bd. of
Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822 (2002). And drivers are
now routinely stopped and detained at sobriety checkpoints without any judicial or legislative preclearance,
even when data suggests that stops based on individualized suspicion might be more effective at deterring
drunk driving. See Mich. Dep 't of State Police v. Sitz,
496 U.S. 444 (1990).
To be sure, the entanglement of dragnet and special
subpopulation searches does not completely explain
why courts have permitted these intrusions. But it does
so in part. Specifically, the courts' use of generalized
statements about government interests and their lack
of differentiation between different levels of privacy
intrusion are, in some respects, outgrowths of their
using the same "special needs" test for both dragnet
and special subpopulation searches, irrespective of the
different issues that the two kinds of searches raise.
When the T.L.O. Court created the special needs test
for determining when reasonableness balancing should
displace the warrant and probable cause requirements,
it carefully delineated the reasons why the requirements were impracticable under the circumstances of
that case. But when the Court imported the special
needs test into the dragnet context, those same arguments carried less weight. A school can easily seek a
warrant before implementing a dragnet drug testing
policy, even if it is cumbersome to get a warrant before
searching a student's backpack after a teacher observes
what he thinks is a violation of the school's drug policies. Conversely, the teacher who wants to search that
backpack should have no problem meeting a threshold
requirement of individualized suspicion, even though
it might defeat the purpose of a dragnet drug testing
policy to require the school to show individualized suspicion before testing any particular student.
To recognize these differences, however, would require recognizing that dragnet searches. are different
from special subpopulation searches. Having merged
them together, the Court now uses the same special
needs test in all public school cases, as if "special
needs" were a condition that attaches to the public
school setting rather than a way of assessing whether
© 2012 Thomson Reuters
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some feature of the search justifies dispensing with the
warrant and individualized suspicion requirements.
This is confused. Whether there are special needs that
justify dispensing with those requirements is not simply a function of where the search is performed. But,
as presently configured, administrative search doctrine
can be used to justify warrantless and suspicionless
searches even under circumstances compatible with
requiring warrants or showings of individualized suspicion. The result is more unnecessary intrusions, both
in dragnet and in targeted form.

Conclusion
In its current form, administrative search doctrine
does little to check arbitrary, unnecessary, or harassing searches. The problem will only become worse as
technology expands the government's investigative
arsenal. Dragnet searches are on the rise, and current
doctrine has no means of ensuring that they will be
employed only when necessary, nor that officials' discretion will be appropriately limited when dragnets are
used. Moreover, the Supreme Court has begun to approve wholly suspicionless and highly invasive searches of individuals who belong to groups considered to
have reduced expectations of privacy. One important
step toward reform involves disentangling dragnet and
special subpopulation searches and measuring each by
criteria that better fit the issues that each kind raises.

One important step toward reform
involves disentangling dragnet
and special subpopulation
searches and measuring each by
criteria that better fit the issues
that each kind raises.
For dragnet intrusions, the courts should restore the
two threshold requirements that existed before the crosscontamination. First, before a court engages in reasonableness balancing, it should ask whether the government has taken steps to effectively limit the discretion
of the officials executing the dragnet so as to prevent
arbitrary, discriminatory, and harassing intrusions. One
means of satisfying this requirement would be by requiring a warrant issued by a neutral and detached magistrate, as contemplated in Camara, or at least by some
other form of referral to a third-party decisionmaker.
Another is to proceed pursuant to a statute that clearly
defines when and how the government should perform
an administrative intrusion with sufficient limitations
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on government discretion. But if the government has
not taken any such steps to limit discretion, then the
dragnet should only be upheld if the government can
rely on some other exception to the warrant and probable cause requirements to justify its actions.
Second, the courts should consider dragnets to be a
disfavored method of investigation -permissible only
when individualized suspicion cannot be requiredrather than as one of several reasonable ways of proceeding. If an individualized suspicion regime could
adequately advance the government's interests, then a
dragnet should be deemed constitutionally unreasonable. After all, dragnets always invade the privacy and
security interests of innocent citizens, and such invasions should be tolerated only when they are necessary.
Otherwise, as science and technology advance, government intrusions are likely to become both more invasive and more routine. And the effects of such intrusions on individual privacy need to be considered not
individually but in the aggregate. A world in which the
government routinely searches everyone is not one with
significant regard for privacy as we understand it, nor is
it one where privacy can be restored by correcting a few
of the most visible or objectionable intrusions.
On the special subpopulation side, one important
step would be to avoid the one-size-permits-everything
reasoning that now accompanies the special needs test.
Rather than declaring that special needs exist in certain
reduced-expectation-of-privacy contexts such that no
searches conducted in those contexts need satisfy the
Warrant Clause, courts should ask whether complying
with the warrant and probable cause requirements is actually impractical in a given kind of case. In determining whether to waive the warrant requirement, a court
could consider how easy it is to obtain a warrant in the
jurisdiction, whether some other form of preclearance
might be available to protect against arbitrary government action, and whether exigent circumstances make
even small delays untenable, as when a suspect might
escape or do violence before the warrant process could
be completed. In assessing whether to waive the probable cause requirement, a court might consider whether
the person conducting the search can be expected to understand the probable cause requirement, whether that
person has a relationship to the person being searchea,
and whether anything else about the context indicates
that a probable cause requirement would undermine an
important government interest. When a probable cause
requirement is not appropriate, however, the govern-
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ment should still be required to show some reduced
form of individualized suspicion to justify its intrusion.
Authorizing suspicionless searches merely because the
probable cause requirement seems too strict borrows
inappropriately from the example of dragnets, where
we accept that people will be searched even though
they are not individually suspected of wrongdoing.
Special subpopulation searches involve discretionary
decisions to target particular individuals or groups of
individuals, and the government should have to explain
why it selected those individuals to bear the burdens of
being searched. Wholly suspicionless searches, like the
one upheld in Samson, should be impermissible.
Finally, there is the question of how courts should address scenarios in which the search at issue is a dragnet
search of members of special subpopulations that have
reduced expectations of privacy. When both the dragnet and special subpopulation rationales might apply,
the court should require the government to articulate
which it is relying on and, depending on the answer,
apply different doctrinal tests to determine the search's
validity. If the government claims that the reduced expectations of privacy of a special subpopulation member justify its actions, it should have to demonstrate
why the warrant and probable cause requirements are
impractical in that situation. And even if it is unrealistic to require probable cause, the government should
have to demonstrate that there was some level of individualized suspicion to justify targeting the person
searched (although the quantum of individualized suspicion required will vary depending on the situation).
Alternatively, if the government contends that it should
be exempted from the individualized suspicion requirement altogether because it is relying on a dragnet
search, it should have to demonstrate, as a threshold
matter, that there are limitations on the exercise of executive discretion and that an individualized suspicion
regime would not be equally effective in achieving its ·
goals. Once it satisfies those requirements, it still must
pass muster under the reasonableness balancing test.
Disentangling dragnets from special subpopulation searches will bring some much-needed clarity to
administrative search law. Such clarification might
or might not persuade decisionmakers to restore appropriate threshold requirements about discretion and
individualized suspicion. If it did, so much the better.
And even if not, it would help make plain the extent
of the costs to privacy under present administrative
search law.
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